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 Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human-like capacities to non-human entities.  
 Anthropomorphism is both beneficial and problematic for comparative research. 
 We advocate a mindful approach to anthropomorphizing in comparative science. 
 
Abstract 
Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human-like capacities and traits to non-human entities. 
Anthropomorphism is ubiquitous in everyday life and in scientific domains, operating both 
implicitly and explicitly as a function of the human lens through which we view the world. A 
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highlighted the negative and, to a lesser degree, the positive implications of anthropomorphism. 
In this article, we aim to provide a nuanced perspective of how anthropomorphism impacts the 
work of comparative affective science. Specifically, we discuss three domains of empirical 
inquiry in which lessons can be drawn about the benefits and pitfalls of anthropomorphism: 
responses to death, inequity aversion, and prosocial behavior. On balance, we advocate a mindful 
approach to anthropomorphizing in comparative affective science, and comparative science more 
generally. 
 
Keywords: anthropomorphism; comparative psychology; comparative science; comparative 
thanatology; inequity aversion; prosocial behavior 
 
1. Introduction 
The scientific investigation into the basis of emotion or affect has, to date, largely taken a 
human perspective, where the quest to understand the basis of human experience has influenced 
which questions are asked, how experiments are designed, and how the ensuing data are 
interpreted. When humans are the target of study, this ‘anthropocentric’ perspective is relatively 
innocuous – indeed, ‘seeing human’ in other humans is entirely sensible. Put simply – when 
aiming to understand human affective processes, adopting a human mindset is both rational and 
defensible. However, when other species are the focus of scientific inquiry, this human 
perspective can impact the scientific process in a way that might ultimately be a disservice to 
uncovering the veridical truths about the cognitive or affective processes at hand. This tension is 
especially relevant to the field of Comparative Affective Science, a newly emerging inter-
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basis of affect through comparing how animals produce, perceive, and experience affective states 
and, potentially, emotions.  
Of particular relevance to the arena of comparative affective science is 
anthropomorphism – the attribution of human-like capacities and traits to non-human entities 
(Epley et al., 2007). Comparative affective science is in many ways an inherently 
anthropomorphic endeavor, adopting a starting point from the human perspective. Consider 
common research questions asked in comparative affective science: can non-human animals 
(henceforth animals) experience emotion – or is animal experience better characterized as affect? 
How are such states expressed by animals? Are the physiological signatures of human affective 
experience similar to those observed in animals? Do human expressions of emotion overlap with 
those observed in other animals?  
Since Darwin debated such questions in his seminal work, The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), one view is that one should expect evolutionary 
continuities in both the capacities and the underlying mechanisms driving affective processes for 
closely related species. In this regard, a legitimate starting point of many such research questions 
may in fact be the anthropomorphic view that animals with close phylogenetic relationships to 
humans should experience some affect and emotions similar to what is seen in humans (Bekoff, 
2000; Burghardt, 2004; de Waal, 2016, 1999). However, this anthropomorphic approach has also 
been widely criticized as inherently flawed and to be avoided (Wynne, 2006, 2004), particularly 
as human emotions themselves have also been proposed to be socially and/or culturally 
constructed (e.g., Barrett, 2013; Barrett and Russell, 2014; Boiger and Mesquita, 2012; Mesquita 
and Boiger, 2014). Our view is that the best path most likely lies in the middle of these views, 
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Burghardt, 2006; de Waal, 2016, 1999) – at least when undertaken mindfully and judiciously. At 
the same time, anthropomorphism must be treated with caution, especially for processes that are 
not yet well understood in our own species, such as how individuals come to experience and 
perceive emotions.  
The goal of this article is to discuss and highlight the benefits and drawbacks of 
anthropomorphism within the emerging field of comparative affective science. Following a 
review of the concepts and empirical evidence regarding anthropomorphism generally, we 
review the influence of anthropomorphism on research in three emerging areas: responses to 
death (comparative thanatology), inequity aversion, and prosocial behavior. Given the 
implications that anthropomorphism may have for understanding the affective lives of animals, 
many of these themes discussed in the context of affective science also extend to comparative 
research more broadly. 
 
2. Anthropomorphism: Concept and Consequences 
Discussions of anthropomorphism date back at least to late 6th and early 5th centuries BC, 
with the Greek philosopher-poet Xenophanes calling out the human-like representation of gods. 
In the intervening centuries, anthropomorphism has received attention from philosophers, 
sociologists, and psychologists alike. Social psychological research in particular has produced 
myriad insights into the nature and consequences of anthropomorphism.  
Epley and colleagues (2007) provide a useful definition, proposing that 
anthropomorphism, “describes the tendency to imbue the real or imagined behavior of nonhuman 
agents with humanlike characteristics, motivations, intentions, or emotions” (pg. 864). A related 
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consciousness, and emotional experience to nonhuman agents (Gray et al., 2007), though 
anthropomorphism subsumes mind perception in that anthropomorphized targets can be imbued 
with human-like traits other than mind (e.g., behaviors and physical forms). The targets of 
anthropomorphism span animals, technological devices, inanimate objects, nature, and 
supernatural entities. Standing as the conceptual converse of anthropomorphism, denial of 
human-like characteristics to animals also occurs, a process termed anthropodenial (de Waal, 
2016, 1999). Such denial can also target humans, in which case the process is considered 
infrahumanization (Leyens et al., 2000) and dehumanization (Haslam et al., 2008). 
Research shows that both adults and children readily anthropomorphize non-human 
entities (Severson and Lemm, 2016; Tahiroglu and Taylor, 2018; Waytz et al., 2010a), though 
several individual difference and situational contexts promote its occurrence. Epley and 
colleagues (2007) theorized that anthropomorphism is most likely to occur (1) in contexts in 
which anthropocentric knowledge is current in the mind and relevant to the situation, (2) when 
people are motivated to interact effectively with nonhumans, and (3) among individuals who, 
chronically or situationally, lack a sense of social connection to other humans. A range of 
empirical data supports these tenets (e.g., Bartz, Tchalova, & Fenerci, 2016; Epley, Akalis, 
Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2008; Epley, Waytz, Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008; Severson & Lemm, 2016; 
Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010).  
From a social psychological perspective, this trio of reasons reinforces the broader idea 
that anthropomorphism is a process with functional value (Airenti, 2018). More specifically, 
anthropomorphism might fulfil the self’s need for agency (e.g., competence, Ryan & Deci, 2000; 
White, 1959; aligning with #1 and #2 above) and for communion (e.g., belonging, Bakan, 1966; 
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anthropocentric standpoint on individual wellbeing, anthropomorphism may confer some 
benefits. We will return later to consideration of whether anthropomorphism is good or bad (or 
rather, in what contexts it may be so) for science itself. 
Anthropomorphism and the related processes of mind perception are considered to have 
particular impact on the domains of moral reasoning, decision making, and action (Gray et al., 
2012). The granting –or, indeed, denial– of human-like traits and capacities to others dictates 
inclusion or exclusion in the circle of moral regard, or the boundary between those to whom we 
extend moral consideration and those to whom we do not (Graham et al., 2017; Laham, 2009). 
Entities granted full humanity, so to speak, are deemed to be within the circle or ‘in-group’, 
whereas those denied some or all human traits are excluded as ‘out-group’. This process holds 
for human entities (e.g., humans denied human traits are excluded from the circle of moral 
regard; Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011) as well as nonhuman entities (e.g., 
anthropomorphism of nature increases the propensity to protect it; Tam, Lee, & Chao, 2013).  
In the domain of moral reasoning, anthropomorphism impacts attributions of 
responsibility to those who have carried out an action that harms others. Entities granted human-
like mental capacities such as free will and consciousness are held to be more morally 
responsible for their actions than entities who are denied such capacities (Phelan and Waytz, 
2012; Shapiro, 2006). This concept of moral agency applies in the case of human entities (Giffin 
and Lombrozo, 2018; Gray et al., 2012; Gray and Wegner, 2009; Robbins and Litton, 2018), as 
well as in the case of nonhuman entities: attributing more mind to artificial intelligence software 
correlates positively with perceived intentionality and wrongness of moral violations brought 
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Thus, from a functional perspective, anthropomorphism appears to stem from the human 
needs to understand the surrounding world and to connect socially with others. One key 
consequence of anthropomorphism is that it shapes moral reasoning about an entity: whether it 
deserves concern and protection and also whether it is held morally accountable for its actions. 
As we now make the case, these processes that underlie and flow from anthropomorphism are 
especially pertinent in the context of human-nonhuman animal interactions. 
In the discussion of animal anthropomorphism specifically, it is relevant to distinguish 
between two types of anthropomorphism. Burghardt (2004) discriminates between naïve 
anthropomorphism and critical anthropomorphism. Similarly, de Waal (1999) delineates 
anthropocentric anthropomorphism from animal-centered anthropomorphism. For both, the 
former (i.e., naïve or anthropocentric anthropomorphism) reflects the process of 
anthropomorphism captured by the social psychological research reviewed above: the casual 
attribution of human traits to nonhumans. By contrast, the latter (i.e., critical or animal-centered 
anthropomorphism) sits at the heart of anthropomorphism in science: the assumption of 
continuity in conscious experience, behavior, and cognition between phylogenetically-closely 
related species made in the effort to develop testable scientific hypotheses. Bekoff (2000) uses 
the term biocentric anthropomorphism to describe a similar process. 
Naïve or anthropocentric anthropomorphism is inculcated from an early age, especially 
via exposure to anthropomorphized representations of animals. Indeed, animals are pervasively 
depicted in an anthropomorphized manner in children’s books, cartoons, and films (Blanchard, 
1982; Geerdts et al., 2016). Deploying the above social psychological theories, it would seem 
that children’s media creators leverage the dynamics of agency and communion: 
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for social connection, respectively. In terms of the former, the effects of such representations are 
mixed, with some research suggesting that anthropomorphized animals undermine learning about 
the biological world (Ganea et al., 2014; Waxman et al., 2014), whereas other research 
documents learning benefits (Bonus and Mares, 2018; Geerdts et al., 2016; McCabe and Nekaris, 
2018). In terms of the latter, anthropomorphized animals are used to promote learning about 
human social dynamics and morality (Mierek, 2010), though such efforts may ultimately fail to 
produce anticipated prosocial outcomes (Larsen et al., 2018). Related research suggests that 
anthropomorphized depictions of animals in marketing targeting children are effective because 
they promote kinship between the child and the product (Veer, 2013), corroborating the view that 
anthropomorphism serves social ends. 
Among adults, anthropomorphism of animals is readily apparent, though it varies as a 
function of species. Work by Eddy and colleagues (1993) demonstrated increased 
anthropomorphism of animals with increasing perceived similarity to humans, with primates 
high in both and invertebrates low in both (see also Harrison & Hall, 2010). Such a pattern is 
consistent with de Waal’s (2016) perspective, given the close phylogenetic distance between 
non-human primates and humans, particularly the great apes, whose lineage diverged from ours 
only relatively recently (Prüfer et al., 2012). Given that phylogenetic relatedness also predicts 
moral concern over the distress of animals (Rae Westbury and Neumann, 2008), it is no surprise 
that anthropomorphic representations of animals can result in increased concern for animal 
welfare, a form of moral regard (Butterfield et al., 2012). Urquiza-Haas and Kotrshcal (2015) 
offered a theoretical model which argues that anthropomorphism of phylogenetically similar 
species is relatively more automatic and reflexive than that of phylogenetically dissimilar 
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While naïve anthropomorphism can sometimes increase concern for animal welfare, it 
can also dangerously distort people’s perspectives of animal-human closeness, leading to 
negative consequences for animal welfare and conservation. Research has demonstrated, for 
instance, that seeing great apes depicted in the movie entertainment industry and other 
anthropomorphized contexts negatively impacts public attitudes about their endangered 
conservation status. For example, seeing a chimpanzee placed within a human context led to 
participants being less likely to consider great apes as endangered and more likely to consider 
them suitable as pets than when considering or viewing them in naturalistic contexts (Leighty et 
al., 2015; Ross et al., 2011). In this regard, naïve anthropomorphism can have serious negative 
implications for people’s treatment and understanding of animals, particularly those threatened 
by environmental destruction in their natural habitats.  
 Naïve anthropomorphism of animals is common, reinforced from an early age, and 
varies across phylogeny. It also comes with a risk of undermining support for animal welfare. If 
it is so common in the general public, to what degree is anthropomorphism of animals common 
in scientific practice and how does it impact interpretations of behavior that appear to overlap 
with those observed in our own species? To answer these questions, we turn to the concept of 
critical anthropomorphism.  
 
 
3. Anthropomorphism in Comparative Affective Science 
Given that researchers are themselves humans, it is no surprise that there exists a natural 
inclination to anthropomorphize when engaging in comparative science. A major concern is that 
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from which comparisons to other species should be made. Povinelli and colleagues (2000) warn 
against being held “hostage by a theoretical framework” that uses human experience as the basis 
of analogy to other species for mental states.  
From a biological stance, a more powerful approach would be to objectively identify the 
environmental pressures shaping the evolution of a given trait and then use those to make 
bottom-up predictions about which species should expected to display the given trait based on 
socio-ecology. Such an approach is reflected in Pauen’s (2012) description of “third-person” 
perspectives when making mental state inferences. In Pauen’s view, third-person perspectives, in 
contrast to first- and second-person perspectives, are inherently objective in nature, are driven by 
theory, and are tested against empirical evidence. Such purely third-person perspectives, 
however, are difficult to achieve, and indeed identify; Pauen (2012) writes, “it may be difficult to 
find out whether or not an individual case of mental state ascription in fact involves the second- 
or the third-person perspective” (pg. 41).  
Given the above-noted ubiquity of anthropomorphism, including in science (Asquith, 
1984), we argue that it is most useful to consider how and when anthropomorphism influences 
the scientific process, rather than trying to avoid it altogether. In fact, there may be certain 
benefits to an anthropomorphic approach. From a philosophical stance, Pauen (2012) argues for 
the utility of second-person perspectives as an effective way to leverage insights about one’s own 
mental states (i.e., via first-person perspective reflection) to better understand other entities. 
Focusing on anthropomorphism in comparative science specifically, Bekoff (2000) argues that 
“anthropomorphism allows other animals' behavior and emotions to be accessible to us” (pg. 
867). For closely related species, assuming shared homologies may even be the most 
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empirical hypotheses (de Waal, 1999). Such a view extends Burghardt’s (2004) proposal of 
critical anthropomorphism, which involves “not only careful replicable observation, but also 
knowledge of the natural history, ecology, and sensory and neural systems of animals as well” 
(pg. 15). 
For animals sharing close phylogenetic histories, similar social structures, and behavioral 
ecologies, anthropomorphism can provide a framework that facilitates identification of larger 
patterns, a sort of gestalt whole, in a series of discrete or seemingly unrelated behaviors (de 
Waal, 2016). Given that animals cannot explicitly tell us about their inner experiences, 
understanding their underlying emotional experiences is inherently challenging. On this view, 
comparative affective science might use an anthropocentric lens to at least begin to query the 
affective lives of animals. At the end of the day, what researchers have available to them is 
observable behavior or, in some limited cases, physiological or neurological markers.  
Nonetheless, as described above, this is a double-edged sword; while anthropomorphism 
may help us identify these experiences, interpreting animal behavior as human-like might 
impede the ability to see the true abilities, or even the unique capacities, of other species (de 
Waal, 2016). Moreover, extending first-person perspective (“I”) insights to a second-person 
perspective (“you”) inference about the mental states of an animal requires as a starting point 
that mental states are indeed ascribed to that animal (Pauen, 2012). Anthropomorphism might 
therefore generate inferential gaps into the mental capacities of other animals. To use a simple 
example, bats are mammals with eyes. Observable movement behavior of bats could easily be 
attributed to visual processing. Moreover, their sound production is out of the range of human 
hearing. Therefore, it would not be unreasonable that we would have assumed that bats, like 
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their world, the latter of which, of course, reflects reality. The anthropocentric misattribution of 
bats’ movement behavior to visual processing could have hindered discovery of this unusual 
sense. Moreover, because we lack sonar systems, even once we understand that bats use sonar to 
navigate, it is unlikely that we will ever know what it is like to be a bat (Nagel, 1974). 
For affective processes, the challenge is even more acute – we might use a human 
framework as a starting point, but there is a serious risk of missing or misattributing affective 
responses that are specific to other species. How do we even know which behaviors might 
indicate affective experience? Part of solving this puzzle involves understanding which 
situational cues might generate affective experience. Inferring negative affect is relatively 
straightforward; we have a good sense of what is aversive (i.e., pain, inability to reach available 
food), and we have good evidence that these influence cognition and behavior both (Bartolic et 
al., 1999; Lavric et al., 2003).  
Inferring positive affect is more challenging. Indeed, it is as yet unclear what causes 
positive affect in other species (Smith and Brosnan, 2019). Among humans, the positive affective 
space is rich with a diversity of emotions (Fredrickson, 2013; Shiota et al., 2014), yet outward 
nonverbal expression of such states is limited in its relative distinction among these states 
(Sauter, 2010). Moreover, the quintessential cue presumed to indicate experienced positive 
affective states in humans, the smile, is in fact displayed in several contexts that are dubiously 
indicative of positive affective experience (Ansfield, 2007; Bonanno and Keltner, 1997; 
Fredrickson and Levenson, 1998; Hoque and Picard, 2011; Keltner and Buswell, 1997; Kunz et 
al., 2013), and sometimes is not displayed in seemingly objectively positive contexts (Crivelli et 
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In addition to identifying the most suitable behaviors to infer affective experience of 
either valence, comparative affective scientists must also overcome inferential biases regarding 
the complexity of the phenomena at hand. Such biases as they play out in comparative science 
are explored, and indeed, debated, elsewhere (e.g., Dacey, 2016; Karin-D’arcy, 2005; Zentall, 
2018). Put succinctly, most researchers advocate being mindful of parsimony and avoiding 
assuming complexity. Applying such views to comparative affective science, it is crucial to 
restrain from presuming that affective processes in humans are complex and to consider the 
degree to which the most parsimonious explanation may be the best explanation. 
To integrate these broad themes regarding the benefits and pitfalls of anthropomorphism 
in comparative affective science, we will briefly explore three topics relevant to comparative 




3.1 Responses to death 
The nature of responses to death is of great interest to scientists and philosophers alike, in 
no small part because such responses provide insight into the evolution of more general cognitive 
and emotional processes (Brosnan and Vonk, 2019). Comparative thanatology is the study of 
how both human and animal species respond to dying and dead conspecifics (Anderson, 2016; 
Anderson et al., 2018; Gonçalves and Carvalho, 2019). Animals respond in a diverse number of 
ways to death in conspecifics, “from exploration, affiliation, caretaking and grief reactions, to 
avoidance, sexual interest, abusive treatment, and even cannibalism” (Anderson, 2019). Given 
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capacities, Anderson (2019) argues that existing frameworks, developed within the context of 
human research, can provide useful starting points for interpreting how and why animals respond 
to death and what this can tell us about underlying mechanisms. As such, the field of 
comparative thanatology may be considered anthropocentric in its roots. 
In humans, the concept of death comprises at least four cognitive components: 
irreversibility, non-functionality, inevitability, and causality (Anderson, 2019). Irreversibility 
refers to an individual’s awareness that death is irreversible; non-functionality reflects 
understanding of non-sentience following death; inevitability is the awareness that death is 
inevitable and universal; and causality refers to the understanding of the biological causes of 
death. A critical question for comparative thanatology, then, is whether animals display 
behaviors that indicate, or could give rise to, analogous concepts. 
Aside from awareness of the inevitability of death, which would be difficult to 
empirically demonstrate in a nonverbal organism, there is evidence that some animals may 
exhibit behaviors that would indicate or give rise to the concept of death. For example, in a 
number of primates as well as other animals, mothers continue to carry, care for, and stimulate 
their dead offspring for prolonged lengths of time following death (e.g., dingo: Appleby, Smith, 
& Jones, 2013; giraffe: Bercovitch, 2013; elephant: Payne, 2003; great apes: Biro et al., 2010; 
Reggente et al., 2016; Sugiyama, Kurita, Matsui, Kimoto, & Shimomura, 2009; Van Lawick-
Goodall, 1971). Although this suggests that mothers may not initially be able to detect non-
sentience in the corpse, the experience of witnessing an absence of recovery in the corpse is 
likely to provide mothers (and others) an opportunity to learn about the irreversibility of death 
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In a similar manner, numerous animals have been reported to attempt to physically 
stimulate, manipulate, and revive corpses, sometimes in notably aggressive ways (Anderson et 
al., 2010; Appleby et al., 2013; Bercovitch, 2013; Biro et al., 2010; Buhl et al., 2012; Douglas-
Hamilton et al., 2006; Dudzinski et al., 2003; Kirchhoff et al., 2018; Merte et al., 2009; Payne, 
2003; Reggente et al., 2016; Stewart et al., 2012; Sugiyama et al., 2009; Van Lawick-Goodall, 
1971; Yang et al., 2016). Making contact with the corpse in this way may provide an individual 
with a chance to investigate whether there are any remaining signs of agency, thus enabling them 
to better understand that that the corpse is behaviorally and psychologically non-functional (see 
Gonçalves and Carvalho, 2019 for a review). 
More directly relevant to comparative affective science, comparative thanatology also 
considers the nature of grief. In humans, grief following death (i.e., bereavement) is 
characterized by dysphoria and sadness that is initially acute, but can continue for several years 
(Zisook et al., 1982). However, human grief can also involve positive emotional experience, at 
least periodically, which might ultimately facilitate coping with the loss (Bonanno et al., 2008). 
Resonant with recognizing both positive and negative affective components of grief, King (2013) 
argues that a critical aspect to observing grief-like responses in animals is to consider love-like 
responses. Notably, theories of human grief hold that it is a process that promotes group 
cohesion, so is thus socially functional (Averill, 1968; Averill and Nunley, 1988; Bonanno, 
2001). Gonçalves and Carvalho (2019) offer a perspective that emphasizes the social 
functionality of grief-like responses in non-human primates. 
A number of studies have reported evidence of grief-like responses in animals that 
resemble those of human bereavement. For instance, Van Leeuwen and colleagues (2016) 
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sanctuary in Zambia. The chimpanzees dragged the corpse out of the forest into an open area 
near to the fence, where he could be observed and subsequently retrieved by caregivers. More 
than half of the group gathered quietly around the body to observe and inspect it; some 
individuals were observed to guard the body, cover it with branches, and even clean its teeth with 
a piece of grass. Although it is difficult to determine what underlying processes motivated the 
chimpanzees to respond in this way, the nature of their responses is notably analogous to funeral 
rituals in many human societies (Bendann, 2013; Robben, 2017).  
Several other examples of grief-like responses in animals appear in the empirical 
literature. A chimpanzee’s death happened in the course of a zoo-based study on sleep patterns, 
which allowed the experimenters to empirically document substantive changes in conspecific’s 
patterns of sleep, behavior, and use of the enclosure subsequent to the death (Anderson et al., 
2010). In a study of baboons, Engh and colleagues (2006) showed that females who had recently 
lost a close relative during predatory attacks showed significant elevations in their cortisol levels 
as compared other females who had also observed the attacks but were unrelated to the victim. 
Such a pattern is consistent with documented links between cortisol and grief in humans (Jacobs 
et al., 1987; Pfeffer et al., 2009; Richardson et al., 2015). 
Taken together, these studies suggest that animals may experience states akin to human 
grief. Driven by an inherently anthropomorphic view (namely, that other animals may respond to 
death in similar ways to those observed in humans), comparative thanatology, has made great 
strides even despite being a nascent field. Additional work is needed, however, to determine the 
contexts of these behavioral responses and, importantly, what they indicate about the affective 
processes involved in death responses. We call for objectivity in documenting and reporting 
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demonstrate in terms of establishing support for the view that animals grieve. The field of 
comparative thanatology may benefit from thorough documentation of the full range of 
responses to death, and indeed the contexts in which they arise (see also Gonçalves and 
Carvalho, 2019). A strong argument can be made for the need to examine responses to death 
across species, while also recognizing the inherent variability the emerges within a species 
(King, 2013). In some cases, this may mean recording cases of ‘no response’ – but such evidence 
is important when seeking to establish the core comparative question at hand.  
Within any field of comparative science, including that of thanatology, we advocate a 
phylogenetic approach that spans many animal species. Currently, work in this area is 
predominantly focused on primate species, which will need to broaden. Fortunately, the field is 
now growing in positive directions, with case reports now coming in from a broader range of 
species (e.g., Bearzi et al., 2018; Valdes and Laidre, 2019). It is plausible that the emergence of 
grief-like responses occurs along phylogenetic, or indeed species sociality, lines. We are excited 
at the prospect of the field of comparative thanatology undertaking such an approach.  
 
3.2 Inequity aversion 
Critical anthropomorphism makes the case that informal anecdotal observations and 
corresponding anthropomorphic interpretations can inspire novel research questions and enable 
researchers to gain a more contextualized view of animal experience. This is not to say that 
anthropomorphic interpretation should stand alone, but rather can be used to generate testable 
hypotheses to determine if, in fact, continuity across species holds.  
One such example is relayed by Brosnan, who as a graduate student experienced an alpha 









Advocating Mindful Anthropomorphism 18 
obtain peanuts. This was notable as some of the foods, such as orange quarters, were generally 
assumed to be of higher value than peanuts. Why, then, was the alpha male going to such effort 
to “trade down”? One possibility is that he wanted what everyone else had. To test this 
empirically, Brosnan designed a study to test how monkeys responded to a food they normally 
readily ate when a partner received a more preferred food immediately beforehand (Brosnan and 
de Waal, 2003). Indeed, capuchin monkeys refused to participate for rewards they would 
normally work for if their partner got something better. In the sixteen years since, Brosnan and 
others have demonstrated that other primates do this, have begun to document the causes of the 
sometimes substantial variability seen across individuals, and have found a pattern of presence 
and absence across species that suggests that it evolved in concert with cooperation tendencies 
(Brosnan and de Waal, 2014). Evidence for inequity aversion has also been found in non-
primates, and also, thus far, generally follows the same pattern linking inequity responses and 
cooperative tendency (Massen et al., 2012; Range et al., 2009; Wascher and Bugnyar, 2013). 
Thus, an initial (anthropomorphic) observation led to an empirical study that opened an entire 
area of research. 
This example is particularly relevant to comparative affective science for several reasons. 
There are (at least) two non-mutually exclusive ways in which this reaction could come about. 
Individuals might cognitively assess their rewards, comparing them to those of others, and then 
make a decision about how to respond. Alternately, individuals may experience an affective 
response to serially receiving less than a partner. This latter view is an emerging theory in human 
research; for instance, there is debate about whether humans’ reactions to inequity are driven by 
spite or frustration (McAuliffe et al., 2014). Relatedly, Yamagishi and colleagues (2009) have 
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emotions such as anger or disgust. One reasonable hypothesis, based on this, is that responses to 
inequity, including those of other species, are driven by affective responses (thus truly 
constituting ‘inequity aversion’). Understanding the differences and similarities in inequity 
aversion across species could help us to better understand how and for what purpose inequity 
aversion evolved, and indeed provide insight into the affective and/or emotional processes at 
play. 
 
3.3. Prosocial Behavior 
Research on prosocial behavior in animals underscores another important lesson for 
anthropomorphism in comparative science. Put straightforwardly, we do not know if animals 
even understand the tasks we provide in the same way that we do, much less interpret the goal or 
purpose in the same way (Brosnan, 2018). Achieving alignment between intended dynamics of a 
task and animals’ experience of those tasks is essential for drawing accurate conclusions 
regarding the comparative nature of the process at hand. Here we consider how anthropomorphic 
assumptions about the purpose or the goal of the task can lead to errant conclusions.  
To set the scene, it is worth noting that prosocial behavior in humans is, at least in some 
contexts, driven by affective processes. Engaging in prosocial behavior elicits positive states 
(Aknin et al., 2012; Ferguson et al., 2012). In turn, positive affective states (i.e., ‘positive mood’) 
promote prosocial behavior (Carlson et al., 1988), as do a wide range of discrete emotions, 
including compassion (e.g., Condon, Desbordes, Miller, & DeSteno, 2013), gratitude (Ma et al., 
2017), awe (e.g., Piff, Dietze, Feinberg, Stancato, & Keltner, 2015), moral elevation (e.g., 
Erickson et al., 2017; Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010), and guilt (e.g., O’Malley & Andrews, 
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engage in a prosocial action, also motive prosocial behavior (Johnston and Krettenauer, 2011; 
Lindsey et al., 2007; van der Schalk et al., 2015, 2012).  
As is clear, a primary driver of research on human prosocial behavior is answering the 
question of when and why it occurs. In animals, before querying the affective processes relating 
to prosocial behavior, it is important first to answer the more fundamental question of whether 
animals display prosocial behavior. Namely, research on prosocial behavior in animals aims to 
determine whether subjects make decisions that benefit their partners at no cost to themselves 
(Cronin, 2012; Sosnowski and Brosnan, 2019).  
It is relatively straightforward to identify naturalistic contexts or create research contexts 
in which the motives for human prosocial action are clear. This objective is less easily met for 
animals. Early studies on prosocial behavior in animals exposed subjects to a choice between 
two trays, one of which rewarded only them and one of which rewarded both them and their 
partner with the same food. Such a task is analogous to tasks used with humans (Fehr et al., 
2008; House et al., 2013) – and a sense-check from the anthropocentric lens reveals that the task 
seems reasonable: choose to benefit the self or choose to benefit the self and the other. 
Despite passing comprehension controls designed to ensure that they understood the 
design, in none of these studies did subjects show evidence of prosocial (or even spiteful) 
behavior. Instead, they were indifferent (Jensen et al., 2006; Silk et al., 2005). These findings 
were perplexing, given that observational studies showed evidence of what appeared to be 
prosocial behavior and/or motivation. Moreover, subsequent studies using a different paradigm 
requiring a choice between two tokens found evidence of prosocial behavior (de Waal, 
Leimgruber, & Greenberg, 2008; Horner, Carter, Suchak, & de Waal, 2011; Massen, Luyten, 
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More recent research indicates that subjects may not have understood the original design 
as intended. A follow-up study using the same design and population as Silk et al. (2005) 
initially replicated the finding that subjects showed no evidence of prosocial behavior. However, 
when subjects were given the opportunity to be the recipient of a different chimpanzee, who was 
trained to make prosocial choices, they then were more likely to choose prosocially for their 
original partner, suggesting that they may not have originally understood the purpose or goal of 
the task (Claidière et al., 2015). In another study, when access to the choice apparatus depended 
upon a partner “unlocking” it via costly behavior (i.e., the partner had to give up food), subjects 
made more prosocial choices (Schmelz et al., 2017). If there was no cost for the partner to unlock 
the apparatus, or the experimenter unlocked it, subjects were indifferent. The authors interpreted 
these findings as evidence that the subjects choose prosocially when there was a reason to do so, 
namely, to help the partner who paid a cost to help them. 
The lesson here is clear: proceeding with an anthropocentric view of tasks risks false 
negative results – if a task reflecting our understanding of a process fails to provide evidence for 
that process in animals, we may erroneously conclude that animals don’t possess the capacity for 
that process, when in reality they just didn’t see the task the same way we did (Brosnan, 2018; de 
Waal, 2016). Of course, researchers are already cognizant of this, and work hard to provide 
comprehension controls to verify subjects’ understanding of the set up. However, as above, there 
are cases in which researchers do all of this and fail to identify sources of misunderstanding.  
We point here to one factor that may decrease anthropocentric errors in task design: 
researcher familiarity with the species of study. In primate social cognition, there is greater 
evidence of complex behavior in long-term studies, for instance at long term field sites or in 
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these sites are both more familiar with their subjects and are seeing them in a more natural 
context, where the animals clearly understand the ramifications of their decisions. This 
emphasizes the need to combine information from multiple domains when undertaking 
comparative science, and to make sure that whenever possible, experiments are informed by 
knowledge of the contexts in which a behavior emerges in natural contexts (Janson and Brosnan, 
2013). In so doing, the field may reap the benefits of critical anthropomorphism, but avoid the 
pitfalls of anthropocentric task design. 
 
4. Conclusion: Anthropomorphize Mindfully 
In our review of anthropomorphism in the context of empirical study into responses to 
death, inequity aversion, and prosocial behavior, we hope to have identified the potential benefits 
and pitfalls of anthropomorphism in comparative affective science, and indeed other comparative 
sciences. As we have discussed, although anthropomorphism can benefit the process of theory 
generation (as we saw with inequity aversion) and drive inquiry into new domains (as we saw 
with the emerging field of comparative thanatology), it can also lead researchers to make 
erroneous conclusions, and thus compromise the conclusions made. We advocate an approach 
wherein researchers anthropomorphize mindfully – aware of the complexities of it while reaping 
its benefits. While some have made the case that purely objective, non-anthropomorphic 
approaches are most desirable (Wynne, 2006, 2004), with the above-reviewed evidence in hand, 
we agree with others who point out that it is near impossible to discern pure objectivity nor is it 
clear that purely objective approaches are indeed the most desirable (Pauen, 2012). 
In this article, we primarily focused on anthropomorphism as it plays out in psychological 
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neuroscientific approaches offer intriguing and complementary perspectives. For example, 
Ferrari (2014) argues that embodied simulation, supported by mirror neuron systems, supports 
complex processes that involve mental state attribution, such as empathy and moral judgment, 
and, further, that such a system can has evolutionary roots identifiable in nonhuman primates. 
The impact of such neurologically-driven processes on mental state attribution in terms of 
anthropomorphism remains to be seen, but is a fruitful path for future inquiry. More broadly, as 
the methodologies and techniques available to neuroscientists broaden, so too does the ability to 
examine the brain basis for many of the processes discussed in this article (see also Miller et al., 
2019).  
Regardless of its benefits or its pitfalls, it is clear that anthropomorphism is a natural bias 
for human researchers – a bias to see the world through our own human eyes is difficult to avoid 
entirely. Such a bias has parallels to the cultural bias that researchers bring to the study of human 
adults (Henrich et al., 2010) and children (Nielsen et al., 2017). We applaud recent efforts to 
address such biases in human research and suggest that comparative scientists might 
productively learn from such efforts. Comparative affective science, and comparative science 
more generally, will be better for not only the awareness of anthropomorphic biases but also 
effective and active engagement with them. 
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